Roger Williams University

DOCS@RWU
Macro Center Working Papers

Center For Macro Projects and Diplomacy

April 2004

Economic conditions and trends in the region: potential strategies
to encourage foreign direct investment
Lester Thurow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dorothy Lemelson
Massachusetts Institute of Techonology

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/cmpd_working_papers

Recommended Citation
Thurow, Lester and Lemelson, Dorothy, "Economic conditions and trends in the region: potential strategies
to encourage foreign direct investment" (2004). Macro Center Working Papers. 8.
https://docs.rwu.edu/cmpd_working_papers/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center For Macro Projects and Diplomacy at
DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Macro Center Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Volume 1

Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series

Spring 2004

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN THE REGION
Potential Strategies to Encourage Foreign Direct Investment1
Dr. Lester Thurow, Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson Professor of Management, MIT

Let me start with a puzzle. In 2002, everything we know about human beings says that we are
normally distributed. Some of us are very tall, some of us are very short, but most of us are
average. Some of us are very smart, some of us are very dumb, but most of us are average. In
anything you look at in human beings, you tend to come to that conclusion, but if you look at
countries you see something very different. In 2002, the range in per-capita income across the
world using purchasing power parity was about 500 dollars in the poorest countries in the world
and 40,000 dollars in the richest countries in the world. In 2002, there were 28 countries with 847
million people living in those countries whose per capita income was above 15,000 dollars. At the
same time there were 169 countries with 5 billion people living in those countries with per-capita
income below 7500. Between 7,500 and 15,000, the middle, there were only 11 countries with 130
million people.

In the world, there is nobody in the middle when it comes to countries. You are rich or you are
poor and there is no middle class. And if you look at those eleven countries, there are either
countries rapidly shooting up, or, like Argentina, rapidly shooting down. Nobody stays in the
middle very long. And the question then obviously is in my puzzle to you, that you can think of
answering at the end: Why is there nobody in the middle – given that we think that human
talents are normally distributed?

Of course, part of the answer is: it didn’t used to be that problem. Go back 300 years to 1700. In
1700, economic historians believe that there was no significant difference in per capita income
between the wealthiest countries in the world and the poorest countries in the world. We were all
equal. Because in 1700, 98% of the people in every country around the world worked in farming
and every farm in the world used exactly the same technology: people power, animal power,
human and animal manure, seeds collected from the last crop. There were places in the world
where they had better rainfall or soil, but they just had more people. In 1700, economic historians
believe that half the GDP of the world came from India and China because half the people of the
world lived in India and China.
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And then in the early 1700’s, the French invent, and in the late 1700’s the British perfect, the
steam engine. The first industrial revolution and all of that… And with the invention of the steam
engine, the economic historians say that 8000 years of agriculture-dominated human activity
have come to an end. If you want to be rich as an individual, a company, or a country, you have
to play the industrial game. And in the country where this industrial revolution began, Great
Britain, is usually dated to about 1780. By 1810, just thirty years later, the wealthiest industrialists
in Great Britain were wealthier than the landed dukes, the royal dukes, who had been the
wealthiest people in Great Britain for the previous one thousand five hundred years.

And of course the problem was some people leapt into this revolution and some did not. It
wasn’t that the poor became poor, it was the fact that the poor didn’t become richer while other
people were becoming richer, because if you go back and compare the poorest countries with a
per-capita incomes of late feudalism, it looks remarkably similar because they used exactly the
same technologies that were basically used in late feudalism.

If you take a course in economic history, about 100 years later, the economic historian will talk
about the second industrial revolution. And that was the second industrial revolution that
revolved around electrification. And we tend to forget how pervasive electricity is until it goes
out. If you were in NY last summer when the electricity went out and you had a hotel room, you
could not get into it because electronic keys don’t work when electricity is out.

Fast forward to year 2000, some people have leapt into the steam revolution, some didn’t. Some
further leapt into the electrical revolution, some didn’t. There are about 6 billion people in the
world and tonight 1.6 billion of them will go to sleep in a house that does not have electricity. A
hundred and thirty years after the revolution begins, a third of humanity is not participating in it,
and by the time you get to the year 2000, the gap in per capita income between the richest
countries in the world and the poorest countries in the world is now on the order of 140 to 1.

Complete equality has been replaced by great inequality. And the question to ask is: “Why did
some people leap, the minority, and the majority of people do not leap?” I think that fifty or five
hundred years from now, an economist historian is going to call our period of time the third
industrial revolution. This a revolution based on microelectronics, computers,
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telecommunication, man-made materials, robotics and biotechnology. Now, in each of those
areas we can talk about a revolution that is going to change the world. Of course the one that may
affect the Middle-East is the one called man-made materials and the fuel cell. If perfected, 90% of
the demand for oil will disappear.

And the answer is the engine problem has been solved – if you go and talk to the automobile
companies. What have not been solved are the infrastructure problem and the storage problem.
But if you want to examine in detail, each of these six technologies are going to cause a major
revolution in the world as to what technologies you want to leap in to be successful. Now,
oftentimes, when you have a revolution like this, you don’t know what the equivalent of steam
and electrification are until you look backward.
This time I think we do, because I think I know exactly what the historians, 500 years from now,
are going to say about our time.

In the year 2000, plus or minus, because of biotechnology and human genome project, for the first
time in human history, people could change their own genetic make-up. And that is in fact the
most important invention of all human history. More important than the wheel, because we can
change ourselves. We are not talking about something that we might do, we are talking about
something that we are doing. Anybody in this room who wishes to adapt small children can
make them 4 to 5 inches taller. Human growth hormone: cheap, plentiful, available, no known
side effects. Technically illegal in the United States for vague ethical reasons, but you can get it
from the Bahamas, We have Americans going to the Bahamas getting growth hormone building
taller children. And they are not people with short children. You got a son with 6 foot 4 who’d
like to play NBA basketball, and at 6foot 4, no matter how coordinated he is, he is very unlikely
to make a team. If you make him 6-foot 9, he is almost guaranteed to make a team. 5 inches
means 3 millions dollars a year and as we speak we have Americans building basketball players.

Now, that revolution in technology has lead to the second revolution. Now if you think of that
technology revolution, what you should think of it is a shift from an industrial society to a
knowledge-based society. And the symbol of this but not the cause is Bill Gates. Because for all of
human history, the wealthiest person in the world has always commanded natural resources. I
used the word ‘commanded’ deliberately because usually they were a general or an emperor.
Julius Cesar was the wealthiest man in ancient Rome. Because of his generals that conquered
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Spain, he legally owned all the gold mines of Spain. Sometimes it was the emperor of China,
sometimes it was the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, sometimes it was the King of Saudi Arabia,
and in 1996 it was the Sultan of Brunei. But in 1997, it’s Bill Gates. Of course, the interesting
question is what does Bill gates own? No land, no gold, no oil, no buildings, no machines, he
does not even own patents. What he does is control the knowledge process. And that makes him
the wealthiest person in the world and depending on the day, and this is one of those days, his
company is the wealthiest company in the world.

This is a symbol of profound human change. For the first time in human history, you can get
fabulously rich by controlling knowledge. That’s never before been possible. That technology
revolution has lead globalization. It’s very important to understand that the world today is a lot
less globalized than it was a hundred years ago, because a hundred years ago was the peak of the
colonial empires. In 1900, 25 % of the landmass of the world was ruled from London: Australia,
Burma, India, Nigeria, Canada, etc. Fifteen percent of the world was rule from Paris. The United
States was running Cuba and the Philippines. Japan was running Korea and Taiwan. China had
been divided. There were only 40 independent countries in the world as opposed to today’s more
than 200. And of those forty, half of them were not fully independent because they were in Latin
America under the thumb of the American Monroe doctrine.

But this is a very different globalization. This is a globalization led by business firms, not
government and armies. And the problem governments have is that it’s basically under-cutting
their authority and power. Governments in the twentieth century got used to thinking of
themselves as air traffic controllers. I can control the flows of my economy. And maybe even
more important, in the twentieth century, they had to think of themselves as runway builders,
airport builders. Can I build a runway so desirable that the rest of the world would like to land
on my economy and participate and so good that my people and firms can take off and
successfully compete in the global economy. I build that runway out of educated citizens,
infrastructure, legal and social systems, and if I play it at the highest level, research and
development.

Now, there is a third revolution that goes with these two, it also has some magic dates. It’s called
1978, 1989, 1991- the years communism collapsed. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping stands up and says it
does not make any difference whether the cat is black or white, the question is ‘does he catch
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mice?’. He announces that he will abolish the communes, and within eighteen months, every
hectare of land in China is given to some peasant family under the family responsibility system,
and the largest country in the world that has been outside the capitalist economy joins the
capitalist economy. And, as it joins, it leads. Napoleon can be said to be correct. In 1808,
Napoleon supposedly said to Lord Robbins, one of the royal dukes of England: “China is a
sleeping dragon, when it awakes, the world will shake.” And the answer is China has awoken
and the world is shaken.

Three times in the last half of 2003, I went around the world, each time stopping in four to five
countries, and there is only one topic of conversation everywhere around the world: things
moving to China. If you go to Mexico, the television set manufacturing industry for the United
States that used to be in northern Mexico in the Maquiladoras: moving to China. If you go to
Malaysia, the computer manufacturing that used to be in Malaysia: moving to China. If you go to
Turkey, the European operations that used to be in Turkey: moving to China.

Now, at this point, you should ask a question: “What does this all have to do with Gaza and this
part of the world?” And the answer is: quite a bit. The first thing it has to do is, because of
globalization in the good old days, you had to be a big country to be rich because you really
needed economies of scale. But today, as of this moment, if you take the ten wealthiest countries
in the world per capita, only one of them, the United States, is a large country, and the other nine
all have a population less than ten million.

So in some sense today, because of globalization, there is an advantage of being small because if
you can get organized, and that’s easier in a small country, you could be a Singapore. I don’t
know if it’s really true, but Lee Kwan Yue supposedly has a computer where every tree in
Singapore that is more than twenty centimeters in diameter is listed and he can track the growth
of every tree in Singapore. You can not do that in big economy but you can do it in a small
economy. More to the point, and this I know is true, he has a list of a hundred high-flying human
beings in Singapore that he thinks are going to be the hot shots of the future, and he tracks their
career, and he tries to make sure that they have the right experiences, so that they will be in fact
be the leaders of the future. You can do that in a small country, you can’t do that in a big country.
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And of course the answer is that it then means that a small place like Gaza, or Gaza plus the West
Bank has a legitimate chance to get rich. The other thing of course is that what this knowledgebased revolution is doing is meaning that natural resources are less important. That’s a good
thing for Gaza and a bad thing if you are in the Persian Gulf. Because one of the things you have
to worry about if you are in Saudi Arabia is what are we going to do, not when oil runs out, but
what are we going to do when oil no longer play the role in the world economy that it does
today? We have an example of that: in 1880, Chile was the 8th wealthiest country in the world per
capita. The US was number seven. Britain and Australia were one and two. Chile was wealthy in
1880 by the exports of natural deposits of guano nitrate necessary for making gunpowder.
Electricity and copper had not been developed. And then the Germans discover how to make
synthetic nitrates. Essentially overnight, Chili goes from wealthy to poor because the resources
upon which it depended ceased to be valuable resources. Those guano nitrate deposits still sit
there in Chile, unmined, because today there are no reasons to mine them. And the fuel cell is the
equivalent of synthetic oil. Overnight, if it happens, it would make a Kuwait into a poor country
as opposed to a rich country, just like Chile, overnight, which went from a rich country to a poor
country.

And so the good news is: you don’t have to be big to be rich, that fits our test case here. You don’t
have to have natural resources to be rich, and this part of the Arab world does not have natural
resources. But of course there is bad news. In the world, the biggest economic disaster is central
Africa; per capita income is falling below where they were in 1965. But the second largest
economic disaster is the Arab world. In the Arab world, nine out of ten countries have a falling
per capita income. Some have a high income, some have a low income, but everybody is falling
including places like Saudi Arabia.

And about the only two exceptions are at either end of the Arab world: Morocco at one end, and
UAE and Oman at the other end. Everybody in between has falling per capita incomes. And that
includes Israel. Israel’s per capita income, given the current events, is down twelve percent and is
falling at the rate of one or two percent a year. The official unemployment rate in Israel is above
ten percent but the real unemployment rate is closer to 20 percent, because you should ask
yourself the question: those people in the isolated Jewish settlements in Gaza or the West Bank,
how do they earn their living? People right on the green line can commute to jobs in Israel
proper. But if you are one in the isolated settlements, how do you earn a living? The answer is
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that they all have make-work government jobs, this is all disguised unemployment. They are not
real jobs. They are make-work government jobs. Paid for by the taxpayer. They may guard the
settlements, they may teach kids, but they are jobs that wouldn’t exist if Israel did not have those
settlements.

And so one of the things you need to think about is: Why is this part of the world a failure? And
if you are thinking about Gaza and macroeconomic engineering, how do you make Gaza a
success? What I am going to suggest to you is that infrastructure is very important but it won’t do
it by itself. The place you have to start, and this is something that you need to know, every
country in the global economy has to have a selling proposition. For a number of years, I ran the
Jeddah economic forum in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and the last time I did it, we had a gentlemen
who, at that time was the head of the London Business School, give a talk on “How does a
country sells itself?”. What’s the selling proposition? China knows what its selling proposition is.
Come to China, this is the cheapest place to make everything. Which means that if you want
somebody to come to your country, you have to have a better selling proposition because they
have the option to go to China and, so why should they come to your country as opposed to go to
China?

And of course another example at the other end was Ireland. Think of Ireland, the miserable
Irish. For all of human history they were poorer than the English. They joined the common
market 25-30 years ago. They, Portugal and Greece were the poorest countries in Western
Europe. Fast forward 25 years, 2 or 3 years ago, the Irish for the first in human history passed the
English in terms of per capita income. And today they are the third wealthiest country in Western
Europe. The only two wealthier are Norway and Luxemburg. What did the Irish do after 2000
years of miserable failure? The answer is, when they joined the common market, somebody was
either lucky or intelligent, and they said: we have a bunch of miserable companies that make no
money. We have a corporate income tax at 45 percent. What is 45 percent multiplied by zero.
Well it is zero. Why don’t we have zero times zero, that’s also zero!

And so the Irish abolished the corporate income tax, and then they had the basics, education,
legal system, etc, and then a company from outside the common market, looking at the common
market for where to put a factory, Ireland pops to the top of the list. Why wouldn’t I go to
Ireland, pay no taxes and get an engineer I pay 7,000 dollars to as opposed to go to Germany and
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pay 45 percent taxes and get an engineer I pay 25,000 dollars to. Fast-forward 25 years, 70 % of
the Irish GDP is produced by foreign-owned firms. And the Irish for the first time in human
history are wealthier that the English and above the European average, near the top of the
European average.

Now the problem with having an economic development is that everybody knows exactly what
you have to do. There is no mystery in that. The problem is execution. Execution is infinitely
difficult. Suppose you have to do ten things to be developed and you have to do all ten. And if
you do half of them, five, that doesn’t get you halfway to development. It does not do you any
good at all! Do you remember your statistics? One-tenth times one-tenth times one tenth – the
probability of being successful is very small with a lot of zeroes- even though the probability of
succeeding in each of these activities is one out of ten. And we know what these activities are.

The first one, which the West Bank and Gaza violate, you have to have a low population growth
rate! That’s why China is going to be successful and India is not. If you have 5 to 7 children per
woman, you‘ve got something like a four percent growth rate in population! Which means that
your economy can grow at four percent and you make no progress whatsoever! No economy in
human history has ever averaged over four percent for a hundred-year period of time. If you are
growing at the maximum human rate, you cannot succeed economically. And if you look at all
the countries that are rich: Japan, Germany, the United States, they all had at least a century with
their population growth rate is less than one percent. And it’s worse as the denominator gets
bigger.

If you have a high population growth rate, what do you have to do with all those new citizens?
First thing you have to do is bring them up to national average, which means that you have to do
investment in housing, education, infrastructure, all of those things, not to mention what
economists call deepen capital investment, but just to widen it. And with a 4 percent population
growth rate, the society basically has to put 40 percent of its resources into equipping new people
as opposed to raising the standard of living for old people, existing people, and any society that
does that has no income left over to raise the per capita income of what remains. So first thing
you have to think about is low population growth rate. And if you are not willing to do that, you
are not going to develop. That’s not economics, that’s just simple mathematics.
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The second thing you have to do is mobilize resources. Labor, capital, education, infrastructure.
Let me come back to the infrastructure. If you are in Asia, where you have a lot of people, you
mobilize capital. What is the domestic savings rate in China? 30 % . What is the domestic savings
rate in Singapore? 50 %. And those did not happen by accident. They happened because these
governments knew that these societies were short of capital and they had to force people to save
more. That’s easy to do technically, that’s not so easy to do politically. What did we do in the
United State in the nineteenth century? We had lots of capital, we had shortage of people. So, we
mobilized people. We went around the world in places like China and said: come to the United
States of America to build the western half of the transcontinental railway.

We lied to people. We went to Europe and handed out pamphlet with dishonest advertising,
because they basically told poor Europeans that this was a land of gold and that they would have
instant success, and that was not true! But we made great efforts to increase the labor supply in
the United States in the nineteenth century because that’s what we were short of. If you are
mobilizing your resources, you have to focus on the resources you are short of, and of course that
means in Gaza and the West Bank, you have to be like in Asia – and organize a society that is a
high-saving society. Easy to do!

Suppose I abolish credit cards in the United State tomorrow morning. That would triple or
quadruple the savings rate. Because the problem with credits cards is that when you borrow
money to buy, let’s say, your car, you borrow money that somebody else has saved and you
consume it! And you don’t do any saving yourself at all! If I make you pay cash for a car, first of
all, you don’t borrow the other guy’s money and secondly you have got to save you own money
until you get the, whatever, 25,000 dollars to buy a car. It has an enormous impact on saving
rates. No tricks in raising saving rates, the trick is politically doing it, but you’ve got to do it.

Now, infrastructure is right on target: if you remember, that is one of the things that you need to
do. Infrastructure investment allows you to take existing resources and work them more
efficiently together. What the railroads did for the United States is mean that you can grow wheat
in Kansas, which is something you can always do, but know you can get to New York City and
sell it. So that Kansas was a very different place for growing wheat after there was the
infrastructure, because now there was a market that you can sell it to because before that the
transportation costs were so high, by the time you get the wheat from Kansas to NY, it wasn’t
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going to be sold in NY because it wasn’t competitive. So, infrastructure is front and center. So in
that sense I think that we are right on target when we talk about the kind of infrastructure things
that Ernst is talking about.

But who is famous in the world to built infrastructure like crazy, and having a lousy economy?
That was the old USSR, who put enormous amounts of money into infrastructure and got
nothing out of it because in addition to infrastructure you need a motivation system. Something’s
got to motivate the individuals to work hard. I remember the old joke in the old Soviet Union
used to be: they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.

But think about China. The real success story in China is not in the cities where you and I go to
but in the countryside. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping abolished the communes as I mentioned. And By
1990, 12 years later agricultural production had quadrupled. Doubled and doubled again. With
no investments in pesticide, no investments in fertilizer, no investments in machinery, no
investments in transportation, just better incentives. Because for the first time, the peasants in
China had an incentive to do their farming right rather than to do their farming wrong.

The next thing you‘ve got to have is either what economists call social capital or social economies.
Can you work together? Think of ancient Egypt. Why was ancient Egypt rich while the rest of us
were basically living in caves? For two reasons. First of all they had learned how to read and
write, which meant that they could send messages, they could keep records. And they could keep
records of the height of the Nile so that they could regulate for their irrigation. And they had the
social capabilities of working together to build an irrigation system and, more importantly,
allocate the water in the irrigation system. And with those two things, for about 3000 years Egypt
was rich while the rest of the world was poor. So the issue is: do you have technology that the
rest of the world doesn’t have? And do you have the ability to work together?

Now let’s take technology. Because I would argue that on this island we are going to need
something besides having the infrastructure: we are going to need the technology. How do you
get the technology demanded in the world?

There are basically two ways of doing it. One way you can follow is the Japanese- Korean model:
you’re basically trying to copy the technology of the world, bringing their technology home,
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trying to it change a little bit, make it ten percent better and then compete with the rest of the
world. That’s what the Japanese did in the fifties and in the sixties, and that’s what the Korean
had done since essentially the sixties, seventies and eighties. The problem is: the world won’t let
you do that anymore. Remember in the nineteen sixties we used to have all these late-night jokes
with Johnny Carson about Japanese running around with cameras taking pictures of American
factories. How many American factories today do you think would let you in with a camera?
How many do you think would even give a tour?

We now understand that technology is the key to success and everybody locks it up. Now if you
want to learn something, what’s the best way to learn it? Hire a teacher who knows how! Now in
this world, how do you hire a teacher? It’s called foreign direct investment. You hire the
company that’s good at that. You don’t hire them, you bribe the company that’s good at that, to
come to your country. And then, of course, there is the Taiwan model. Taiwan did not know how
to make scanners, but they persuaded Hewlett Packard that they were the best place in the world
to make scanners, so Hewlett Packard came to Taiwan and taught them how to do it, and at one
point Taiwan made a hundred percent of the scanners in the world. They did not learn how to
make scanners; they were taught how to make scanners. Same thing on laptop computers where
they topped out at about 90 percent of the world market. They never learned how to make
laptop computers; they were taught how to make laptop computers. And of course, that’s why
China is so successful today.

If you look at foreign direct investment, excluding the United States, there is about a hundred
million dollars in foreign direct investment that goes to everybody else except the United States.
China gets 60 out of the hundred. India gets 2. Japan gets 1. Foreign direct investment is not
money, 60 Million dollars is trivial in China because with 30 percent internal saving rates, they
have 300 billion dollars worth of internal savings and 550 billion worth of foreign exchange
reserves, and they could easily borrow another trillion dollars from the World Bank.

Foreign direct investment is technology, markets, scarce management skills, scarce engineering
skills: things you can’t buy with money. So, one of the things you need to think a bit in this all
operation is how you get foreign direct investment to Gaza. You won’t just do it with
infrastructure. China has infrastructure. What is the selling proposition you are going to use for
this offshore island, so to speak?
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Now there is something that ought to happen: Egypt has wages lower than China. Egypt is full of
educated people who are underutilized. If you think of a European company doing offshore
manufacturing in the Far East, let’s say China, it’s kind of crazy. Why would they go all the way
to China? Maybe they don’t understand Egypt, but they understand China a lot less than they
understand Egypt. Egypt, which is just on the other side of the Mediterranean, there is a twohour flight versus of a ten-hour flight; there is no change in time-zones. It would make sense to
do all your manufacturing in North Africa. And of course, the European have kind of semirealized this because there are the famous Barcelona Accords which basically say in a very vague
sense that North Africa eventually will be given some kind of NAFTA-type deal where they will
have some special arrangement with Europe.

Now, the interesting thing is that the eastern end of the Mediterranean is left vague as to
whether they are in the deal or out of the deal. It is not obvious if you implemented the Barcelona
accords, whether Gazas, the Israels or the Lebanons are included. I think it is quite obvious that
Saudi Arabias and the Dubais are not included in the Barcelona accords, because they basically
implied that at the very least you have to touch the Mediterranean.

Now the question is, you then have to analyze: Why don’t the European don’t go to Egypt? If
they don’t go to Egypt proper, they are not going to go to this Egyptian free trade zone either, or
even if it becomes a Gaza free trade zone. To answer that, you’ve got to go back and think about
what do these companies want and why don’t they go to these places that would seem to make
more sense than going the all the way to China. I don’t propose the answer to that question, but
what I propose is that you should figure out the answer if you are seriously interested in this
project. I can tell you a little bit of it.

There was a gentleman, I am not sure if he is still a minister of industry, he was for a long time.
He was a MIT graduate and he once called me up and said: Lester, I want you to help me find
some big companies to come to Egypt. I said: I am willing to try. And the problem is, if you come
and talk to the big companies, they will tell you, “I am not going to go Egypt, because those guys
invented bureaucracy eight thousand years ago and every year they have added more! And there
is another word that they used, that nobody used this morning, called corruption- which is also
endemic in Gaza and the West Bank. And if you are business firm and you are in oil, you’ll go
anywhere, almost anywhere, because those guys are tough; they hire armies, they kill people,
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they literally kill people, they know how to bribe people. But even it can get to tough for them.
Indonesia at the moment cannot pump its OPEC quotas. The oil companies are withdrawing
from Indonesia. So, corruption can get so bad that even the oil companies can’t survive. But
normal business firms hit that wall a long time before the oil companies hit that wall. And, so I
went back to my Egyptian friend and I said the problem is that the big companies of the world,
the Intels, etc, just think there is too much bureaucracy and too much corruption, and they have
got places where they can go where they do not face that problem.

What’s the interesting thing in most countries? The interesting thing in most countries is that the
demand for bribes hits foreign firms more than local firms. And foreign firms can’t play this
game because they don’t know who to believe. And if a country has basically a campaign against
corruption, who would be the first person arrested? A foreign businessman – every time. China is
the exception. The Chinese have set the system up so that foreigners have less pressure on them
than the inside people. And it is one of the reasons why the foreign direct investment is not as big
as it looks like. Because if you are a Chinese businessman, what you want to do is to move your
money outside of China, make it look like its foreign money and then move it back in and you get
a better deal than the locals get. And we know that because about 10 billion out the 60 billion of
foreign direct investment into China comes from the Grand Cayman Islands. And no legitimate
person has to move money from the Grand Cayman Islands to China, they’d move directly from
the United States to China or Europe or wherever. So, most of this is presumably Chinese money
leaving China to the Grand Cayman Islands coming back into China.

But the question is: what are you going to do about that? What my friend in Egypt said, (and this
is not an answer): tell your friend back at firm X that I’ll give him the personal number of
Mubarak, and if there is any corruption or if there is any excess of bureaucracy, he should pick
the phone and call Mubarak and Mubarak will straighten it up. I think he would probably have
done that. I know of one case where he did do that. The problem is that this is not a system; you
can’t do that for very many companies. So the question is: what are you going to do in this kind
of an operation to guarantee to these business firms that they are going to have a system without
excessive bureaucracy, without demands for corruption. Free trade zones are a step in that
direction, but there’s got to be guarantees that they are honest.
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Now there is another problem, go back to the Arab World and here the Palestinians are better
than the Arab World. Recently there was a book written by the United Nations that some of you
may have read. It has the biggest circulation of any book written ever by the United Nations:
“Economic and Social Conditions of the Arab World”, written entirely by Arab scholars. In that
book they identify two problems and these are going to need to be solved.

One of the problems they identify in their book, and they use a statistic that is so dramatic that
it’s hard to believe: they claim that from 950 to the year 2000, more than a thousand years, fewer
books have been translated into Arabic than are translated into Spanish every single year. Which
means that if you read Arabic, you don’t know anything about the modern world because very
little has been translated into your language, which says something about intellectual curiosity.
When those numbers came out, I felt kind of good because I have two books translated in Arabic,
which means I am a significant fraction of the total. But they pointed to something else. What
happens if you throw away half of your brains in a knowledge economy? You don’t succeed. Of
course, half the brains are female brains. And the Arab world has a higher rate of illiteracy
among women than Central Africa. Somewhere between sixty and seventy percent of the women
in the Arab world don’t read and write.

Now, that does not work, because if God was running the world and if he could only educate
men or women, he would educate women because there are more spillover effects. There is a
group of Muslims called the Azwalli Muslims. I worked for years at development camps in
Pakistan, lots of them were Pakistanis. They had a sign that they put above the door at a school
that educated both boys and girls that said: Educate a man: educate a man; Educate a women:
educate a family. How can you have educated sons if you have illiterate mothers? It basically
cannot be done!

You know, in the end, as many people basically said today, when I think about these problems, I
am an intellectual pessimist: it does not have prayer of working! On the other hand, I am an
emotional optimist and it just might! Thank you very much.

Notes and References:
1. Transcribed from a presentation given at the 1st Annual Conference of the Center for Macro
Projects and Diplomacy at Roger Williams University on April 15, 2004
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